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JURY CHALLENGES, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AND
LABAT V. BENNETT: A RECONCILIATION
Reasoning that one who opposes the death penalty may deny the
state an impartial trial, most American jurisdictions sustain a chal-
lenge for cause to a prospective juror with such scruples. Recent
decisions, attempting to ensure that the jury truly represents a
"cross-section of the community" have, however, suggested that
due process may be denied when an identifiable class of the com-
munity is summarily excluded from the jury cross-section. The
legitimacy of this theory may well be tested in the Supreme Court
this term, as two cases raise the question whether capital punish-
ment objectors are such a class. This comment -seeks to assess the
validity of the due process approach in the context of traditional
justifications for the challenge to the capital punishment objector.
JUDGMENT by one's social "peers" is constitutionally impermissible
in this country. Unlike the English nobleman who at one time could
require that his case be heard before the House of Lords, members
of which were his actual peers," the defendant in the United States
faces a jury of his constitutional peers; i.e., a jury drawn from a
"cross-section of the community."2 The sole opportunity provided
a litigant to tailor this cross-section for his particular case is the
exercise of challenges to remove certain prospective jurors. Al-
though a limited number of potential jurors may be excused by each
party on peremptory challenges, exercisable for any or no reason
1 
M. CoTru, ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 185-87
(1822). The privilege of a "peer jury" existed, however, only for those charged with
a felony, and was not unattended by disadvantage. The Lords were both judge and
jury, and no challenge to a trier was allowed. Id. "A single historical fact, will
illustrate the danger to which Peers were liable to be exposed by such an unfair mode
of procedure. At the trial of the Protector, Somerset, Northumberland, Northampton,
and Pembroke sat among his Judges." J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEQum ANGLIAE 88
n.a (1825).
- See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 474 (1953); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940); Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1966); Allen v. State, 110
Ga. App. 56, 62, 137 S.E.2d 711, 715 (1964). Possibly the best known expression of
the cross-section principle is found in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 299-300 (1947)
(Murphy, J., dissenting): "[T]here is a constitutional right to a jury drawn from a
group which represents a cross-section of the community. And a cross-section of the
community includes persons with varying degrees of training and intelligence and with
varying economic and social positions. Under our Constitution, the jury is not to
be made the representative of the most intelligent, the most wealthy or the most suc-
cessful, nor of the least intelligent, the least wealthy, or the least successful. It is a
democratic institution, representative of all qualified classes of people."
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whatever, additional prospects may be eliminated by a successful
challenge for cause. Questioning at voir dire is, therefore, primarily
directed toward uncovering in the prospective juryman some dis-
qualifying partiality which will provide cause for his dismissal. The
generally established rule in this country is that a prospect's ad-
herence to conscientious scruples concerning capital punishment
constitutes a complete disqualification from jury service. While
resting ostensibly on the objector's probable partiality, the rule
implies that capital punishment objectors are not a proper element
for representation in the community cross-section which constitutes
the jury. Recently, however, the cross-section concept has under-
gone significant revision, and now represents a severe limitation on
the jury selection process. The conflict between this expanding
definition of "cross-section" and the present prevalence of challenges
for cause to capital punishment objectors raises the principal ques-
tion to which this comment is addressed: What degree of opposition
to capital punishment must be revealed by a prospective juror on
voir dire before he may successfully be challenged for cause without
violating the constitutional right of the defendant to a jury com-
posed of a cross-section of the community?
Development of concepts pervading current jury practice. Any
discussion of proper jury composition necessarily must ascertain the
nature of the protection sought through the constitutional guarantee
of trial by jury. An attempt to trace the history of the jury to its
origin as a means of ascertaining its initial function yields incon-
clusive results.3 Indeed, the trial of citizens by other lay citizens his-
torically has had such widespread employment as to make it seem-
ingly impossible to discern from which germinal concept our system
descended.4 Jurors at first were witnesses, selected for their knowl-
edge of the dispute and the disputants. 5 Gradually the function of
8 See, e.g., W. FoRsYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 1-6 (1852); Grooms, The Origin
and Development of Trial by Jury, 26 ALA. LAw. 162 (1965).
Compare J. PRoFFAIT, TRIAL BY JURY § 2 (1877), with McCready, Challenging
Jurors, 58 Dicc. L. Rxv. 884 (1954), and Kun, Validity of the Unanimous Verdict Re-
quirement, 22 PA. B.A.Q. 15 (1950). Greek, Roman, Scandinavian, and Anglo-Saxon
elements of trial, for example, have been speculatively identified in the history of the
English jury system. See generally J. PROFFATr, supra §§ 1-22. Whatever its origins,
it is clear that trial by jury was instituted in England as an alternative to trial by
combat and compurgation. See id. §§ 12, 28.
rJ. PROFFATr, supra note 4, §§29, 32. "It was, therefore, incumbent on those who
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the jury changed to that of trier of fact,6 and jurors were then
selected for their lack of knowledge or bias regarding the case.
The importance that early America attached to trial by jury is
reflected in the Bill of Rights. Concerned that article III, giving the
Supreme Court the power to review questions of law and fact, was an
abridgment of the finality of a jury's findings of fact, the colonists'
insistence upon clarification produced the sixth and seventh amend-
ments. 7 The seventh amendment concerns civil suits, and provides
that "the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .... ." The sixth
amendment stipulates that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury . . . ." However, these constitutional provisions are binding
only on the federal government, as jury trial has not been held a
discharged this office [of juror] to make themselves acquainted with the matter in
controversy by personal inspection and inquiry before the day of trial so as to be
possessed of the requisite knowledge for forming a judgment." Id. § 32, at 48. For
what a judge considered a mistaken verdict, the jury and the litigant in whose favor
the questionable verdict was rendered were subject to attaint. Webster, Jury Sentencing
-Grab-Bag Justice, 14 Sw.L.J. 221, 223 (1960). Attaint was not a light chastisement,
but involved turning the attained one's wife and children out of doors, destroying
his home and land, and uprooting his trees. J. FoRTrscuE, supra note 1, at 90-91.
The justification for attaint was that, as jurors were witnesses, a mistaken verdict
could be the product only of willful perjury or corruption. J. PRoFSATr, supra note
4, § 32. Attaint, operating thus as a brake on the independence of the jury, persisted
until 1670. In that year, in the famous cause of Bushnell's Case, it was established
that judges might no longer punish jurors because their verdicts were displeasing.
Webster, supra at 223. By Blackstone's time, attaint was an antiquated concept.
"But such a remedy as this [attaint] laid the injured party under an insuperable hard-
ship, by making a conviction of the jurors for perjury the condition of his redress.
"The judges saw this; and very early, even for the misbehavior of jurymen, in-
stead of prosecuting the writ of attaint, awarded a second trial: and subsequent resolu-
tions, for more than a century past, have so extended the benefit of this remedy, that
the attaint is now as obsolete as the trial by battel [sic] which it succeeded: and we
shall probably see the revival of the one as soon as the revival of the other." 3
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAREs 389. With the end of attaint, the capacity of judges
to tyrannize over juries was vitiated. In their own area of deliberation, then, the
decision of the jurors was final. For a discussion of the apportionment of responsi-
bility between judge and jury in eighteenth century libel and sedition cases, for
example, see TRIAL OF JOHN STOCKDALE; FOR A LIBEL ON THE HousE OF COMMONS
(Shorthand by Joseph Gurney 1790) [hereinafter cited as TRIAL OF STocKDALE].
0 "Only by a slow and imperceptible process running throughout five centuries does
the jury come to be solely triers of fact upon the evidence presented. The change is
far advanced in the 1500s, but the following century will close before it can be looked
upon as in all respects complete, and the employment of the jury can be definitely
regarded under all circumstances as a mode of trial rather than a mode of proof."
R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCoDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PEasPrEri 20-21
(1952) (footnote omitted).
'STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION §§918-19 (1833); see J. PROFFATr,
supra note 4, at 121-26,
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fundamental right of the people "inherent in the concept of ordered
liberty," secured by the fourteenth amendment from state abridg-
ment.8 Nevertheless, every state constitution provides for trial by
jury.9
Requirement of jury unanimity. One incident of jury trial
which advances its continued claim as a protector of the people's
liberties is the requirement of unanimity in verdicts.' 0 Operating
under such a requirement, a jury is prohibited by the sheer weight
of its own membership from taking precipitate action. The opinion
of no member of the jury may be disregarded if a unanimous verdict
must be returned, and therefore discussion of dissenting views is
assured.
The unanimity requirement was established in the fourteenth
century,' possibly in satisfaction of the fiction that the jurors spoke
for the country in pronouncing their decision, and the country could
speak with only one voice.' 2 There was no conflict between in-
sistence on unanimity and the function of the jurors as witnesses. As
witnesses, they were supposed to know the truth of the matter in
8 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (dictum) (sixth amendment);
accord, Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1946) (seventh and relevant portion of
sixth); Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 (1877) (seventh). The reason that a jury
trial has not been held to be "fundamental" is that it is but one guilt-determining
process, and others, equally fair, could be devised. Palko v. Connecticut, supra at
325. The restraint of the Supreme Court in not imposing a uniform method of trial
upon the states has been favorably commented upon. E.g., 33 VA. L. REv. 655 (1947).
0 See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1961), citing COLUMBIA UNivERSITY LEGIS-
LATURE DRAFTING RESFARC- FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 578-79 (1959).
10 In the federal courts, unanimity in civil verdicts is required by the seventh
amendment. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898); American Publishing Co.
v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464, 468 (1897). The sixth amendment compels unanimity as to
guilt in criminal verdicts. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 586 (1900). However, these
amendments do not apply to the states, and the Supreme Court has indicated that a
state court practice of accepting majority verdicts would not violate fourteenth amend-
ment due process requirements. Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
See generally Orfield, Verdict in Federal Criminal Cases, 15 MERGER L. REv. 378
(1964).
"I R. MILLAR, supra note 6, at 21 & n.18. Concerning unanimity in British trials,
Blackstone observed that: "This necessity of a total unanimity seems to be peculiar to
our own constitution; or, at least, in the nembda or jury of the antient [sic) Goths,
there was required (even in criminal cases) only the consent of the major part; and
in case of an equality, the defendant was held to be acquitted." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra
note 5, at 376.
In "old times," upon the disagreement of a single juror, the verdict of eleven jurors
was taken and the standout was thrown into prison. However, in the reign of Edward
III it was established that no verdict could be returned by fewer than twelve jurors.
W. FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 241.
2 Webster, supra note 5, at 223.
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issue, and any disagreement among them was thought to indicate that
the dissenters were merely being obstreperous. 13 In the United
States, the sixth and seventh amendments incorporated the common
law characteristics of jury trial at the time of their adoption,14 with
the result that a federal court verdict, to be constitutionally valid,
must be accepted by all the jurors.15 However, since jurymen no
longer serve as witnesses, the traditional reasons for unanimity no
longer apply, and the wisdom of continuing to require it is often
questioned.'6
The extension of the unanimity requirement beyond the thres-
hold question of guilt to the issue of punishment was established
in Andres v. United States.'7 Petitioner Andres was tried in a
federal court for first degree murder under a federal statute which
gave the jury the power to exercise its discrtion in imposing life
imprisonment or death upon conviction.'8  A conviction and death
sentence were affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. The Supreme Court, noting that Congress had given the
jury the discretion of life or death in order to "limit the severity
of the old law,"' 9 held that the proper exercise of this discretion un-
der the sixth and seventh amendments demanded unanimity as to
4 W. FoRsT, supra note 3, at 244; J. PROFFATr, supra note 4, §§ 77-78. The
temptation to engage in obstinate behavior was sharply curtailed by the custom of
confining the jury without meat, drink, fire, or candle until agreement was reached.
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 375; W. FoRsYTr, supra note 3, at 411. This pro-
cedure produced the happy situation in which the unanimity which was thought to
be a philosophical necessity was also a practical certainty.
Il See Baltimore & C. Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (seventh amend-
ment); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (sixth amendment).
Ir See note 10 supra.
16 See, e.g., Kun, supra note 4, where the author notes the inconsistency of requiring
a twelve member jury to achieve unanimity on guilt, whereas a panel of judges trying
the case could decide by a majority vote. The author suggests that if a jury were
unable to agree on the major charge in a criminal case, but could muster a significant
majority, such as 3/4 or 10/12, on a lesser degree of guilt, they should be permitted to
render that verdict. The retention of the unanimity requirement can be best under-
stood from a consideration of the present day functions of the jury, discussed in text
accompanying notes 26-38 infra.
17333 U.S. 740 (1948).
18 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 330, 35 Stat. 1152 (now 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1964)):
"In all cases where the accused is found guilty of the crime of murder in the first
degree, or rape, the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto 'without capital
punishment'; and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the
person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life."
10 333 U.S. at 748. The Court found "expressions [in the legislative history] which
indicate" that Congress's purpose was to mitigate the former statutory scheme which
made death mandatory upon a finding of guilt. Id.
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all issues-"character or degree of the crime, guilt and punish-
ment."20  Applying this standard to the statute, the Court found
that proper construction would require unanimity on either capital
punishment or life imprisonment.21  So construed, the statute was
constitutionally acceptable. However, the conviction was reversed
for failure properly to instruct the jury. In the Court's opinion, the
instructions of the trial judge possibly left the jurors with the im-
pression that if unanimity were not reached on the lesser sentence of
life imprisonment, capital punishment must necessarily be imposed
upon conviction. Therefore, at the present time, no verdict may be
returned in a federal court in a capital case by a jury divided on
punishment, and a similar rule is followed in many, though not all,
state courts.22
The jury as reflector of contemporary community standards.
The functions of the jury cannot be ascertained by examination of
its historical origins.- Rather, its present purposes inhere in the
mode of its accepted operation. One task of the jury is that of
fact finding, and the unanimity requirement assures rigorous exam-
ination into the merits of opposing evidence. In applying the law
to its factual conclusions, however, the jury may also weigh certain
extra-judicial considerations. 24  This function, perhaps appropriately
referred to as the jury's mitigation of laws and penalties,25 flows from
20 Id.
21Id. at 749. The necessary result of the Andres holding is that a jury agreed on
guilt but divided on punishment is a hung jury.
22For a listing of the states which require unanimity on punishment see the ap-
pendix to the opinion of Frankfurter, J., in Andres v. United States, 33 U.S. 740,
767-70 (1948). Florida, for example, requires a majority vote to recommend mercy
upon a finding of guilt of a capital crime. In a recent decision, where the jury split
6 to 6 on the question of whether to make the recommendation, the Florida Supreme
Court held that no violation of due process resulted from imposition of the death pen.
alty. Watson v. State, 190 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1966).
28 See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
21 See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZFmSEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). In conducting
a broad study, authors Kalven and Zeisel compared jury decisions on actual cases
with the response which the judge acknowledged he would have made had he heard
the case alone, in an effort to isolate areas of judge-jury disagreement. In examining
the areas of disagreement discovered, several theories were developed which might
explain what non-judicial factors actually influence a jury in its decision. The authors
concluded that jurors are sometimes motivated by a feeling that the defendant has
been punished enough; that the threatened punishment is too severe; that the victim
engaged in "contributory negligence"; that the law of self-defense allows too limited
a response to an attack victim; or that the offense is too trivial to be visited with the
sanctions of the criminal processes.
25Indeed, there is some indication that during the nineteenth century it was be-
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the panel's power to render a general verdict in complete disregard
of the judge's instructions and the law.26  Resident in this power of
the jury is an effective safeguard against a despotic legal system.27
The jury's mitigation of laws and penalties may take one of
several forms. Thus, it may be a refusal to apply the full rigor of the
law to a given defendant;28 it may involve rejection of the law itself;
or it may be a reaction against the punishment to be inflicted upon
conviction. Examples of jury rejection of law itself are plentiful.
English anti-duelling lawsY colonial taxation and trade regulation
laws,30 and prohibition 1 are outstanding illustrations of legislative
lieved that the jurors had a moral responsibility under "natural law" to follow their
consciences rather than the instructions of the judge. See Note, The Changing Role
of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YA.E L.J. 170, 172-73 (1964).
20 Generally, in criminal cases a jury verdict of acquittal terminates the defendant's
exposure to possible punishment. While the prosecution may request a new trial based
on errors committed by the court, thereby subjecting the defendant to an additional
risk of punishment, a verdict of acquittal rendered by the jury after an error-free
trial will not be overturned, even if the verdict is contrary to the evidence. The
finality of the verdict is its essential element, and is attested to from earliest common
law times by the existence of coercive measures, such as attaint, to persuade the jurors
to change the verdict, as only they could do so. See note 5 supra.
2 See, e.g., TRIAL OF STOOKDALE, supra note 5, at 191-92; Comment, Consideration of
Punishment by Juries, 17 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 400, 401 n.5 (1950); Note, The Changing
Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 YALE LJ. 170, 171 (1964). The insti-
tution of the jury has long excited praise bordering on the adulatory. E.g., 3 BLACK-
STONE, supra note 5, at 381.
28 As an example of jurors' refusal to apply the full rigor of the law, the tendency
of the jury with respect to some defendants is to treat them with more leniency than
would a judge. Examples of factors exciting the jurors' sympathy toward the indi-
vidual defendant are the defendant's overall good appearance; his physical handicaps;
his reputation as an honest, hardworking man; his ignorance; his remorse; his good-
looking wife; his pregnant wife; his crying wife; his military service; or his mother's
poverty. One judge, in response to the questionnaire used by the Kalven study, sur-
mised that a lenient verdict was produced by these circumstances of the defendant,
accused of embezzlement: "Lady; alien; Christmas time." H. KAL.vEN & H. ZmSE.L,
supra note 24, at 202. See generally id. at 193-218. Kalven and Zeisel found that not
only were jurors more sympathetic to certain defendants, but that their reactions could
quantitatively be categorized among defendants differing in sex, race, and age. Id.
at 211, Table 65.
20 "The law of England is clear and explicit, that death occasioned by a duel is
murder; and yet, notwithstanding the numerous trials which have taken place for this
offence, how few have been the convictions.... [Tihey [the jurors] have determined
that killing another in a fairly-fought duel is not murder." W. FoRsYrr, supra note
3, at 264 (emphasis in original).
0 After the French and Indian Wars, when the British attempted to introduce in
the colonies new laws on taxation and trade regulation, convictions of Americans by
American juries were so scarce that British officials were compelled to turn for more
favorable treatment to admiralty courts and courts martial. Powell, Jury Trial of
Crimes, 23 WAsH. 8 LEE L. Ray. 1, 3 (1966).
"1id. at 7. Jurors may also reject the law concerning the elements of a crime,
particularly those based on legal fictions. For example, the jury may refuse to accept
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edicts effectively nullified through jury resistance to their imple-
mentation. Current studies indicate that American jurors tend to
take a more lenient view than do judges of game laws, liquor laws,
gambling, and drunken driving.32 In the jury's nullification of these
crimes through its refusal to convict is found the same jury inde-
pendence that characterized earlier periods, though the absence of
more widespread jury intransigence may be viewed as an indication
of the public acceptability of present law. Jury rejection of legally
prescribed punishment has a similar history. In the early nine-
teenth century in England, there were in excess of two hundred
capital crimes. In reaction to this severity of punishment, juries fre-
quently refused to convict at all.3 Today, if each element of a crime
is made out at trial but the jury convicts the defendant of a lesser
crime, or acquits him, it is plain that the jury's wish is that the
defendant not suffer the consequences attendant the graver convic-
tion,34 a jury behavior frequently encountered in capital cases.85
Whenever the jury gives rein to its own feelings about the de-
fendant and the law, it is clear that extra-judicial standards are being
applied. Yet when unanimity must be reached among twelve people
chosen from a cross-section of the population, personal whimsy can
hardly be the "standard" to which the jury is appealing. It must of
necessity be a community standard, reflecting to some extent the
mores of the population at large from which jury membership is
drawn. The consistent application of a community standard which
rejects a given law leaves the legislature powerless to do anything
save repeal or modify that law. Juries may thus have a direct impact
on legislation. The validity and desirability of this impact have long
been recognized. Over one hundred years ago it was written,
When in respect of any class of offences the difficulty of obtain-
ing convictions is at all general in England, we may hold it as an
axiom, that the law requires amendment. Such conduct in juries
is the silent protest of the people against its undue severity....
the fiction of implied intent in the felony-murder rule. Kalven & Zeisel, The Amern-
can Jury and the Death Penalty, 33 U. CHI. L. Rlv. 769, 775 (1966).
82 See H. KALVEN & H. ZESEL, supra note 24, at 286-97.
3"Id. at 311 n.7; cf. White, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, 29 TENN.
L. REv. 8, 18 (1961).
34See Comment, Compromise Verdicts in Criminal Cases, 37 NEB. L. REv. 802,
808-10 (1958).
" See J. KENNEDY, ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF JuREs 45 (1826); Comment, 12
N.Y.L.F. 688, 691 & n.40 (1966).
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'[I]t has this important and useful consequence, that laws totally
repugnant to the feelings of the community for which they are
made, cannot long prevail in England.'36
This constant tailoring of the law to contemporary community
standards is undoubtedly one of the basic contributions of the jury
system. It thus becomes increasingly important that jury repre-
sentation not be denied to representative and responsible community
viewpoints-in short, that the jury continue to represent a cross-
section of the community-lest this tailoring function be partially
disabled.
The function of voir dire. One brake on the representative
nature of the jury is the exercise of challenges to individual jurors at
voir dire-a pre-trial period during which prospective jurors are
questioned to uncover matters which might disqualify them to hear
the case at hand. The exact scope of the early English use of voir
dire questioning, while presumably broad, is not precisely recorded.37
However, one operative limitation on inquiry was the mandate that
the prospect be asked nothing the answer to which would tend to
dishonor him.3 In America, on the assumption that the juror's
110 W. FORSYTH, supra note 3, at 431, citing LORD JOHN RUSSELL, ESSAY ON ENGLISH
GOVERNMENT 393 (emphasis added).
a1 In England the jurors themselves were not required to answer questions as to
their qualifications before challenge. Instead, the challenge was required to be made
and then supported through subsequent voir dire examination. R. MiuiAR, supra
note 6, at 289-91. The rule forbidding questioning until after challenge has continued
up to the present day in England, where there is no voir dire comparable to that
employed in the United States. There, juries are assembled with few challenges. Id.
at 291-92; Comment, The Jury Voir Dire: Useless Delay or Valuable Technique, 11
S.D.L. Ruv. 306, 308 (1966); see Moore, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors, 16 GEo. L.J.
438, 445 (1928). There is no doubt that the English practice of disallowing voir dire
until after challenge was that which first prevailed in America. See, e.g., Crippen v.
People, 8 Mich. 117, 126 (1860); King v. State, 6 Miss. (5 How.) 730, 734 (1841); State
v. Flower, 1 Miss. (Walker) 318 (1829); State v. Creasman, 32 N.C. 285 (1849). In
State v. Baldwin, 1 Tread. (S.C.) 289, 292-93 (1813), the suggestion was made that the
existence of bias and partiality is itself something which might tend to the prospective
juror's disgrace, and therefore it may not be inquired into prior to challenge. How-
ever, a theory of constructive challenge seems to have arisen, allowing questioning before
a challenge was actually directed. See People v. Rendigs, 123 Misc. 32, 46, 205 N.Y.S.
133, 145 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1924); People v. Larubia, 69 Hun. 197, 23 N.Y.S. 579 (Sup. Ct.),
afJ'd, 140 N.Y. 87, 35 N.E. 412 (1893).
28 So inclusive were the early restrictions on questioning that an inquiry as to
whether the prospect had fanned an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused
was thereby barred, M. Corru, supra note 1, at 82; J. KENNEDY, supra note 35, at 103,
for to believe one's neighbor guilty before the trial of his cause was an unbecomingly
gratuitous expression of hostility, Joy, Challenges to Jurors in Criminal Cases, in 40
LAw LIBRARY 164, 194 (Wharton ed. 1843).
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competency was being tried, the prospective juror himself has been
deemed a witness to whom leading and direct questions could be
posed.32 However, the questioning could not approximate cross-
examination,40 and certain inquiries were forbidden. Parallelling
English practice, American courts rejected any question the response
to which might lead to the prospect's infamy or self-incrimination.
Initially, questions as to his belief in the prisoner's guilt or innocence
were proscribed 14 but that particular limitation has long since fallen
away. Instead, the inquiry is directed to the tenacity with which the
juror would hold to the opinion when confronted with law and
evidence.42 Moreover, inquiry is directed to the prospect's prejudice
against a particular law43 but he may not generally be asked whether
he thinks a crime should be visited with a punishment different from
that which the law prescribes. 44 Despite these restrictions on voir
dire in American courts, it may be said that a broad range of per-
missible questioning remains, controlled chiefly by the discretion of
the trial judge.45
Once voir dire questioning has uncovered facts relevant to juror
qualifications, challenges may be directed by the court or by coun-
sel4 6 to prospects who are, for one reason or another, objectionable.
If the challenge is upheld by the judge, the challenged prospect is
39 Martin v. State, 16 Ohio 364, 369 (1847).
40 Commonwealth v. Burroughs, 145 Mass. 242, 243-44, 13 N.E. 884, 886 (1887); R.
MmLA, supra note 6, at 293-97. The apparent theory for denying questioning which
approached the depth of cross-examination was that the juror would thereby be com-
pelled to be a witness against himself. The proper course for counsel was to introduce
other competent evidence supporting the disqualification of the juror. See Common-
wealth v. Burroughs, supra at 243, 13 N.E. at 886.
41 See generally J. PRoFFATr, supra note 4, §§ 195-97; note 38 supra.
42 See J. PaoFFAir, supra note 4, §§ 186-87.
48 See, e.g., State v. Normandale, 154 La. 523, 97 So. 798 (1923); Hamilton v. State,
74 Tex. Crim. 219, 168 S.W. 536 (1914). But cf. Ideal Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co. v.
Mackowiak, 83 Ind. App. 1, 143 N.E. 614 (1924).
"See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Buzzell, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 153 (1834).
"'See, e.g., United States v. Carabbia, 381 F.2d 133 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1007 (1967); Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 335 Mass. 327, 140 N.E.2d 140 (1957);
State v. Bunk, 4 NJ. 461, 73 A.2d 249, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 839 (1950). See generally
Note, 58 YALE L.J. 638 (1949). See also Stout, The Examination of Prospective Jurors
in Capital Cases, 29 TExAs L. REv. 34 (1950) (procedure in Texas); Thompson, Chal.
lenging the Individual Juror in Nevada Criminal Cases, 12 NEv. S.BJ. 163 (1947).
,6 Various jurisdictions differ in the allocation between court and counsel of responsi.
bility for questioning. For the history and present status of this apportionment, in-
cluding citations to state statutes governing who interrogates, see Note, Voir Dire
Examination-Court or Counsel?, 11 ST. Louis U.L.J. 234, 235-38 & nn.25-32 (1967).
See also 10 MERCER L. R1 .210, 211 (1958).
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excused. One category of challenges comprises peremptory chal-
lenges, of limited number, which enable the parties to remove any
potential juror for whom, irrespective of the reason, they have formed
a distrust.47 On the other hand, challenges for cause are intended to
test a juror's fitness to hear the case. At common law, challenges for
cause were of four types: challenge propter honoris respectum, which
enabled either party to remove a lord of parliament and, incidentally,
enabled the lord to excuse himself; challenge propter defectum, for
deficiency in some area of necessary qualification, such as citizenship;
challenge propter affectum, which concerned bias and partiality;
and challenge propter delictum, for previous conviction of crime or
misdemeanor.48 The category presently encompassing challenges
for cause to capital punishment objectors is propter affectum, which
was in turn divided into principle challenge and challenge to the
favor.49 While the reasons for the various types of challenges are cur-
47 At common law a felony defendant was usually allowed 35 peremptories, on a
very general theory that no man should be judged by another of whom he is for any
reason suspicious. See Comment, Voir Dire-Prevention of Prejudicial Questioning,
50 MINN. L. REv. 1088, 1091 (1966). This apparent tenderness for the defendant pro-
vides a corollary benefit to the state. Surely the defendant will more readily accept
the justice of the verdict, and will be more receptive to rehabilitation, if he feels that
it is the community which has judged him, and not twelve individuals toward one or
more of whom he has some antipathy.
A discussion of peremptory challenges is not pursued in this comment. Though
such challenges may be made with no cause assigned, they are limited in number, and
the full utilization of the number allowed will not usually serve grossly to disfigure
a prospective jury panel. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court has
indicated that perversion by the prosecution of the purposes of the peremptory
challenge, as to exclude Negroes from juries, is not beyond the reach of the equal
protection clause. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1965). In Swain, however,
the record was held inadequate to show such discriminatory use of the challenge. Id.
at 224.
do 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 5, at 361-64; M. Corru, supra note 1, at 75-82.
'1 Grounds for principle challenge were those which indicated such a relationship
to the parties or to the case as to presage a manifest partiality on the part of the
prospect for one party over another. Examples are kinship within certain degrees and
dependency of certain types. The principle challenge raised a question of law.
Challenges to the favor were directed at jurors who were suspected of having some
prejudice in favor of one party not amounting to that which would be grounds for
a principle challenge, the presence or absence of such prejudice being a question of
fact. Examples of this partiality are given in J. KENNEDY, supra note 35, at 95-96,
98.
All the challenges discussed in the text are those to the polls, or to individual
jurors. In addition, it was possible to level a challenge to the array, which charged
some impropriety in the collection of the panel which derogated from the accept-
ability of the entire group. For a discussion of all branches of the challenge for
cause see J. PROFFATr, supra note 4, §§ 148, 166, 167. For a list of causes adequate
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rently viable, the distinction between principle challenges and chal-
lenges to the favor is now largely disregarded,50 as the common law
classifications have been subsumed under the more general heading
of challenges for cause. The continued vitality of the challenge for
cause is a constitutional necessity in the United States, as an incident
of the assembly of an impartial jury.5' Therefore, although usually
the categories of challenge for cause are statutorily defined, any other
objections running to the lack of impartiality on the part of a pros-
pective juror may similarly be asserted.52
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OBJECTION AS GROUND FOR
CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE
It is not clear when challenges for cause to capital punishment
objectors came into use,53 but by 1850 at least, the practice was well
established. 54 Possibly the objection originated in solicitude for the
to support challenges principle and to the favor see THE CONDUCtOR GENERALIS 211-
14 (1792) and Joy, supra note 38, at 164-70.
"o See, e.g., O'Fallon Coal Co. v. Laquet, 198 Ill. 125, 64 N.E. 767 (1902).
51 As an impartial jury is a due process requirement, and as the challenge for cause
is directed at the removal of jurors who show evidence of bias, the challenge continues
to be a constitutionally necessary element of trial by jury. J. PROFFATr, supra note 4,
§ 187 at 242 n,2, and cases cited therein. The indications of bias which may be un-
covered upon voir dire are infinitely varying, and the discretion of the trial judge
governs in the matter of whether the bias, of whatever kind, is of such magnitude
as to disqualify the juror from impartial consideration of the case and the parties
involved. See note 45 supra.
52 Comment, The Jury Voir Dire: Useless Delay or Valuable Technique, 11 S.D.L.
RFv. 306, 329 (1966).
"3Authority on the early English practice does not mention challenges based on
scruples against the death penalty. It has been noted, however, that any question
tending to the juror's disgrace was not allowed on voir dire, and that any inquiry
concerning pre-formed opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused was held
to be such a question. See note 41 supra and accompanying text. If the operative
concept of "dishonor" were so broadiy construed, it seems possible that an indica-
tion by a juror that he had scruples about capital punishment would similarly have
been considered to disgrace him, on the theory that he had indicated that he was so
cavilling a fellow that he would refuse to apply the law of the land.
'
4 See Gross v. State, 2 Ind. 329 (1850); Martin v. State, 16 Ohio 364 (1847). A recent
case, holding such exclusions constitutional under a statute providing the jury
with a choice between life or death, is State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453
(1967), noted in 45 N.C.L. Rxv. 1070 (1967). Iowa and South Dakota are the only two
states which do not allow challenges for cause to the capital punishment objector.
E.g., State v. Lee, 91 Iowa 499, 60 N.W. 119 (1894); State v. Garrington, 11 S.D. 178,
76 N.W. 326 (1898).
Recently, Supreme Court review was sought in a case in which the defendant
alleged that the prosecutor was insincere in averring that the death penalty would be
sought by the state, and in excusing 59 of 119 prospective jurors for capital punishment
objections. People v. Miller, 245 Cal. App. 2d 112, 138-39, 53 Cal. Rptr. 720, 736-37,
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religious or moral convictions of the prospective juror 5 Indeed,
one court explained such challenges as premised upon mental in-
competence, reasoning that a juror who was conscientiously opposed
to the imposition of the death penalty was, as to that issue, insane
and therefore unfit for service.56 In light of the requirement of
unanimity in verdicts, the challenge was almost a mechanical neces-
sity, for when a finding of guilt carried an automatic death penalty, a
juror opposed to capital punishment might be predisposed to acquit.
The resulting denial of a fair trial to the state might justify the
exclusion of all capital punishment objectors if such a scruple were
so strongly held as to make the juror incapable of hearing and
deciding a capital case according to the court's instructions on the
law. However, there were and are varying degrees of opposition to
the death penalty represented in community thought,5' not all of
which would produce an unfair decision. Yet, it has never been the
usual practice to direct extensive inquiry to a juror to ascertain the
depth of his conviction on this subject. Indeed, if a prospective
juror states some scruple against capital punishment, it has been
held no error for the judge to excuse him immediately, with no
cert. granted, 389 U.S. 968 (1967). In granting certiorari, however, the Supreme Court
did not agree to hear this issue. 389 U.S. at 968. However, in two cases the Court
has granted certiorari to consider a straightforward attack on the constitutionality
of the exclusion itself. People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967),
cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1035 (1968); State v. Bumpers, 270 N.C. 521, 155 S.E.2d 173
(1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1034 (1958).
ru See, e.g., State v. Vick, 132 N.C. 995, 43 S.E. 626 (1903); State v. Bowman, 80
N.C. 432 (1878).
1; "A man who would disregard his oath [as a juror] to save his conscience, is not
fit to be trusted anywhere. One who has such strong prejudices, that he can not do
what he knows to be right, when it conflicts with his peculiar theories, or whose mind
is so obscured by. his own peculiar notions, that he can, with a conscience void of
offense, make the law of his country bend to his own will and accommodate its
provisions to his own visions of morality, ought never to be allowed to sit as a juror.
If insane on the particular subject to be inquired into, he is, as to that subject, no
better than if altogether demented." Martin v. State, 16 Ohio 364, 369 (1847).
rZJudicial notice has been taken of the degrees of opposition to capital punish-
ment. See Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 946 (1962). In 1960 a Gallup Poll conducted nationwide showed 51% of the
nation favoring capital punishment. In 1958 a Roper Poll indicated that 47% favored
capital punishment, 50% opposed it, and 8% [sic] were undecided. Brief for Appellant
at 31, Witherspoon v. Illinois, 36 Ill. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967), cert. granted, 389
U.S. 1035 (1968). These figures indicate that a broadly phrased question concerning
opposition to capital punishment could be expected to disqualify from jury service
approximately half of the United States' population. Thus, the impact of such a
question upon the "cross-section" required for the jury is obvious.
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further, more particularized, examination. 5 An atypical case is
People v. Stewart,59 in which a prospective juror was asked on voir
dire if he had any conscientious opinions which would preclude his
joining in a guilty verdict when the crime was a capital offense.
Answering that he was opposed to capital punishment on principle,
he was excused on challenge. The reviewing court drew a distinc-
tion between conscientious opinions, which it posited were personal
and "irresponsible to all human tests and standards," and convic-
tions based on principle, which were said to be responsive to reasoned
argument.6 0 As the operative statute called only for the exclusion
of those with conscientious opinions which would preclude a finding
of guilt, exclusion of the challenged juror for possession of opinions
of principle was error. The court adopted the position that "[h]is
opinions of what the law ought to be, would not disqualify him from
obeying it as it is." 61 The more widely accepted line of cases, how-
ever, adopts the opposing view that any evidence of such scruples
will support a challenge for cause.62  Further, no jurisdiction re-
quires for disqualification that a juror state that he could, under no
circumstances, impose a capital sentence. 3
The necessity for qualifying the jury on the capital punishment
issue, insofar as that issue bears on the jurors' willingness to convict,
would seem to be obviated by the modification of many state crim-
inal statutes to allow the jury to choose death or life imprisonment
upon conviction.6 4 Since under the new statutes a juror, upon a
58 See People v. Hoyt, 20 Cal. 2d 306, 125 P.2d 29 (1942); People v. Goldenson, 76
Cal. 328, 19 P. 161 (1888); Russell v. State, 53 Miss. 367 (1876); State v. McIntosh, 39
S.C. 97, 17 S.E. 446 (1893). But see Bell v. State, 91 Ga. 15, 16 S.E. 207 (1892). Never.
theless, sometimes the question is asked whether the scruples would prevent the juror
from returning a verdict in accordance with the law and the evidence. Some juris-
dictions may disqualify him even though he says his verdict would be uninfluenced
by his opinions. See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 930 (1957); State v. Williams, 50 Nev. 271, 278, 257 P. 619, 621 (1927). In
others, such a response would qualify him to serve. Stratton v. People, 5 Colo. 276
(1880); Williams v. State, 32 Miss. 389 (1856).
' 7 Cal. 141 (1857).
60 id. at 144.
"I Id. at 141.
02 See note 58 supra.
63 See State v. Scott, 243 La. 1, 141 So. 2d 389 (1962); Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461,
88 N.W. 789 (1902). In Scott the prospect stated that the crime would have to be
"pretty serious" before he could return the death penalty. His removal on challenge
was held proper.
" See generally Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U.
PA. L. R v. 1099 (1953). All state statutes governing the imposition of capital punish-
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finding of guilt, may vote to impose life imprisonment which is both
a valid legal alternative and, to him, a morally acceptable one, there
would seem to be no reason for blanket exclusions of capital punish-
ment objectors. Indeed, the statutory modification seemingly has
removed from challenges to such objectors the historic justification
that opposition to a mandatory death penalty might force an objector-
juryman to acquit, for the new forms sever the issue of guilt from
that of punishment. Surprisingly, the addition of a statutory choice
of life or death typically has brought no change whatever in the
approach taken to juror challenges. 65 The rationale supporting this
result is well illustrated in People v. Riser,66 a 1956 decision of the
California Supreme Court. Petitioner Riser was convicted of first
degree murder, and a sentence of death was imposed by a jury
from which all who professed conscientious objection to the death
penalty had been removed. Petitioner alleged that removal of these
persons was unnecessary, since the applicable statute disqualified
only those whose conscientious opinions would preclude a finding
of guilt. Apparently in belief that conscientious scruples would con-
tinue to influence an objector's vote on punishment, the California
court held the continuation of the old challenge procedure to be
proper, stating that "[t]he statute calls for the exercise of a legal
discretion [by the jurors], not for the unswerving application of views
formulated before the trial that will compel a certain result no
matter what the trial may reveal." 67
ment, whether automatically or on the recommendation of the jury, are cited in
Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punishment Con-
stitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 TaxAs L. Rv. 545, 546 n.2, 550
n.29 (1961).
Authority exists for the proposition that the jury at common law has always had
the power to recommend mercy. See 31 MAss. L.Q., Oct. 1946, at 60. However, that
recommendation carried no authority.
01 See, e.g., Gross v. State, 2 Ind. 329 (1850); Rhea v. State, 63 Neb. 461, 88 N.W.
789 (1902). Compare State v. Vick, 132 N.C. 701, 43 S.E. 626 (1903), with State v.
Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 152 EXE.2d 453 (1967). Possible reasons for the continuation of
the disqualification are discussed by Knowlton, supra note 64, at 1106. Knowlton,
summarizing approaches taken by the courts to this question, concludes that continua-
tion of the challenge is felt to be necessary lest the jurors decide cases upon their
own convictions rather than upon the facts adduced, or lest the state be required to
abandon a possible death verdict. Id. at 1106-07.
00 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957).
07 Id. at 575, 305 P.2d at 7. This approach, however, fails to recognize the varying
degrees of opposition to death penalties felt by the individual prospective juror. See
text accompanying note 73 infra. If the evil sought to be avoided by the challenge
is the "unswerving application of views formulated before the trial," it would seem
pertinent to inquire more deeply into the strength with which those views are held.
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Similar results have been reached in the federal courts. In
United States v. Puff,6s decided under a statute giving the jury the
choice between life and death, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the petitioner could have suffered no prejudice
through the removal of capital punishment objectors, even if done
without sufficient cause, if there were on the actual jury no un-
qualified person.6 9 Furthermore, it was reiterated that detailed ques-
tioning to uncover degrees of opposition would be unproductive, as
the prospective juror would no doubt be both uncomfortable and
unsuccessful in identifying the circumstances, if any, in which he
would impose the ultimate penalty. The Puff court, however, spoke
more to the issue of the mechanical problems involved in allowing
jury service by objectors than to any theoretical necessity for re-
moving them. Thus, because Andres required unanimity of the
jury on punishment as well as guilt, disagreements among jurors
some of whom refused to impose death could lead to hung juries and
to "practical immunity from murder. ' 70 This result was said to be
insupportable.
Similarly, in Turberville v. United States,71 the petitioner, al-
though not given a capital sentence, alleged that the excuse on chal-
lenges for cause of those jury prospects who stated opposition to
capital punishment had denied him trial by a true cross-section of
the community. Relying expressly on the Puff decision, the court
rejected his contention, 72 observing initially that not all those who
feel some opposition to capital punishment are necessarily dis-
qualified from service, as "[t]he nub of disqualification on this
ground is whether the opposition is of such nature as to preclude an
impartial judgment on the fact and the law of the case to be tried. ' 7
However, it was not error for the judge in his discretion to sustain
challenges to jurors whose removal was not reasonably required, for
"among those who remained were none who suffered . . . an im-
pediment to proper service." 74
08211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963 (1954), noted in 40 IowA L.
Rv. 374 (1955).
"9211 F.2d at 185.
70 Td.
'1- 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962).
7Id. at 419-20.




The Turberoille approach presents the reasoning which sustains
the widespread use of challenges to remove capital punishment objec-
tors. The discretion of the judge governs the point at which a
prospect will be deemed disqualified.7 5 Although this discretion is
subject to review for abuse, relief on review is usually limited to
cases in which a challenge for cause was improperly denied, resulting
in the inclusion of a biased juror.7 6 An abuse which produces the
unnecessary elimination of qualified jurors has been largely without
effective remedy, as the challenge procedure has been traditionally
viewed as a time of rejection and not of selection.77 The essential
justification for elimination of capital punishment objectors, based
upon the Andres unanimity requirement, is that the mechanics of
jury operation would be partially disabled were an objector to sit on
the jury.78 Nevertheless, as most of the statutes governing punish-
ment for grave offenses allow the jury to select either a life or death
sentence, the inclusion of some individuals who disfavor the death
penalty in all but dire cases might have the compensating benefit of
guaranteeing a wholesome and vigorous discussion of the alternatives.
However, the general practice of not inquiring into the depth of
a juror's scruples but excluding him upon his acknowledgment of
any scruples at all is often given the theoretical support mentioned
by the Puff and Turberville courts; i.e., so long as the jurors actually
trying the case are impartial, it is of no consequence that other,
similarly qualified, prospects were mistakenly rejected. In short,
only a showing of actual prejudice to the defendant by the exclusion
of jurors would justify reversal of his conviction.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON JURY ExcLusIONS
Although traditionally the states have exercised great autonomy
over jury selection procedures, they have nonetheless operated under
constitutional mandates which forbid the exclusion of certain classes
from the jury box.79 Until very recently, the due process clause of
75 See note 45 supra.
70 The reversal is necessary because the presence of a biased juror is a violation of
due process. This general principle was recognized in United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d
171, 185 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 963 (1954), and People v. Stewart, 7 Cal. 141
(1847).
17 See, e.g., Smith v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. 282, 284, 114 P. 350, 351 (1911) (dictum).
718 See note 70 supra.
70 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (exclusion of those of Mexican
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the fourteenth amendment imposed few limitations on jury composi-
tion, as it forbade only the use of triers of fact who would not afford
a fair trial,8 0 judged against concepts of fundamental fairness. There-
fore, the due process clause of its own force would outlaw trial by a
lynch mob,8' but not the erroneous exclusion of a juror for cause
if his replacement were "impartial." However, the more delicate
question of the relative fairness or favoritism shown different de-
fendants by juries of varying compositions has most often been de-
termined under equal protection principles.8 2
As part of a Reconstruction amendment, the equal protection
clause in its classic application safeguarded the rights of Negroes to
a trial before a jury from which members of that race had not arbi-
trarily been excluded.83 Not long after its passage, the clause was
utilized to guard the rights of other minority groups, and the ex-
clusions of determinate religious groups, political parties, races, and
women were successfully attacked by defendants of the class alleged
to have been excluded. 4 Reversal of the conviction of a defendant
who could prove deliberate and invidious discrimination88 against
his class was founded on the theory that there was such a high
probability of damage to the defendant resulting from the class ex-
clusions as to make a showing of actual prejudice unnecessary. The
removal of the prejudice requirement, however, was allowed only in
cases in which the defendant and the excluded jurors were of a class
descent); Kentucky v. Powers, 189 F. 452 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1905) (those of a specified
political party); State v. Guirlando, 152 La. 570, 93 So. 796 (1922) (dictum) (Italians);
Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Grim. 297, 277 S.W. 1091 (1925) (Roman Catholics).
80See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (dictum); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225
U.S. 167 (1912) (dictum).
81 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
82 See, e.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 803 (1880).
88E.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 870
(1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 803 (1880).
"1 See cases cited note 79 supra.
s The difficulty of proving invidious discrimination against a class has long been
acknowledged. See, e.g., Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in
Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 YALE L.J.
919, 935-37 (1965). The courts have accommodated defendants facing such obstacles
by allowing them to make out a prima facie case with a showing of continued absence
from jury panels of members of the class allegedly discriminated against. E.g., Patton
v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463, 466 (1947). See generally Note, State Jury Selection Pro-
cedure Held a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1967 DuKE L.J. 346, 348-49
n.18.
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traditionally subject to prejudice and oppression.86 Defendants not
themselves of an oppressed class, or those alleging exclusion of a
class different from their own, were required to establish actual
prejudice to their position at trial in order to obtain reversal of
convictions by such juries. The difficulty of making an adequate
showing of prejudice effectively restrained the defendant's right to
trial by a jury representing a cross-section of the community.8 7
The stringency of the prejudice requirement was well docu-
mented in Fay v. New York,88 in which labor leaders convicted of
extortion raised due process and equal protection challenges to
New York's blue ribbon juries, from which the laboring classes,
women, and capital punishment objectors were excluded. Em-
phasizing that the defendants were not of the same class as the
excluded jurors, the Supreme Court required that they show, for
reversal of their convictions, that the exclusions prejudiced them
below. 9 The Court concluded that no prejudice was shown and
affirmed the conviction, positing that a different jury would prob-
ably have decided the case the same way. In effect, the blue ribbon
jury was held to be sufficiently representative of a cross-section of the
community.
The prejudice requirement is of greatest concern to a petitioner
with an equal protection argument, since a holding that a procedure
is violative of due process is the equivalent of holding that prejudice
will occur to the rights of any defendant receiving the same treatment
subsequently. 0 A defendant making an equal protection argument,
however, will succeed only if he can show that the procedure was
unfair as to him individually, unless he can qualify under the same
class rule, in which case prejudice is presumed. Because of the in-
so Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477-78 (1954); Note, The Defendant's Challenge
to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal
Protection, 74 YALE L.J. 919, 920-23 (1965).
11 For a discussion of the restrictive scope of the "cross-section" concept, as well as
a comparison with "cross-section" in the federal court system, see generally Note,
State Jury Selection Procedure Held a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1967
DuKE LJ. 346, 350-56 & nn.25-53.
8 332 U.S. 261 (1947), noted in 16 FORDHAM L. REv. 276 (1947) and 33 VA. L. REv.
655 (1947).
sD 332 U.S. at 293.
90 See Note, The Defendant's Challenge to a Racial Criterion in Jury Selection: A
Study in Standing, Due Process and Equal Protection, 74 YAr. L.J. 919, 936-38 (1965).
See generally Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme
Court, 71 YA.E L.J. 599, 636-38, 658-59 (1962).
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dividualized nature of the equal protection claim, the precedential
value of an equal protection reversal is limited. Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that the equal protection clause is at best an
inadequate tool for achieving the goal of cross-sectional jury repre-
sentation in every case.
The inherent limitations of an equal protection approach to jury
selection procedures seemed to have been alleviated by Labat v.
Bennett,9 a recent due process decision by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit presaging a new approach to state jury selection
practices. In a decision reversing the convictions of two Negroes
who were tried by a jury from which daily wage earners were liberally
excused to expedite the selection of veniremen, the court held the
daily wage earner exclusion to be a denial of both due process and
equal protection. While noting that the daily wage earner category
encompassed a large part of the Negro community, the Fifth Circuit
nonetheless declined to base its decision solely on a finding of racial
discrimination, but held additionally that the exclusion of daily wage
earners from the venire sufficiently abridged the cross-section of the
community as to constitute due process and equal protection viola-
tions. 92 Implicitly, the court thus removed the necessity for a class
to be one traditionally subject to bias and oppression before its
exclusion would produce an unconstitutional jury. Additionally,
by approving citations of state court decisions in which petitioners
had successfully attacked the exclusions of classes of which they were
not themselves members,93 the court indicated its intention to allow
any defendant to challenge the composition of a jury from which
community members were erroneously excluded. This abandonment
of the traditional equal protection analysis and of the actual preju-
dice requirement was accomplished by raising the more refined equal
protection considerations to the magnitude of due process rights.
Holding, in effect, that due process requires a meaningful cross-
01365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 991 (1967), noted in Note, State
Jury Selection Procedure Held a Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1967 DuKE
L.J. 346.
92 365 F.2d at 719-20.
93E.g., State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965). The Madison court
allowed a defendant to challenge the exclusion of those who would not state a belief
in God. The court held the exclusion to be a violation of due process. Also approvingly
cited is Allen v. State, 110 Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964), which held, in allowing
a white civil rights worker to challenge the exclusion of Negroes, that a jury not repre-
sentative of the community denies due process to any defendant. 865 F.2d at 723.
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section of the community, the court attempted to implement this
theory by requiring that jury exclusions be evaluated against a three-
fold test: the exclusion must be related to juror competence; or it
must be related to community need; and it must not unduly abridge
the concept of cross-section.9 4 Implicit in this test is a new approach
to state jury exclusions. Although the interaction of the components
of the triple test was not clearly delineated by the Labat court,0 5 it
seems clear that the cross-section requirement serves as a limitation
on justifiable exclusions for competence and public need; therefore,
even acceptable categories of jury exclusions must not be so over-
inclusive as to vitiate the cross-section. An approach which thus con-
cedes the primary importance of the cross-section wholly undercuts
the validity of the state's former justification that the jury used was
arguably impartial, and therefore it did not matter that there were
other community members, arguably similarly impartial, who were
not allowed to serve. The Labat rejoinder is that the state must
show an acceptable justification for their exclusion. That the cross-
section requirement should function as a limitation on jury ex-
clusions seems soundly justified by its inherent ability to assure the
presence of many community viewpoints, and, in the context of the
unanimity requirement, a community standard.9 6
IMPACT OF LABAT V. BENNETr ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT CHALLENGES
To what extent, then, does a reasonable necessity exist under the
Labat tests to exclude objectors to capital punishment from juries
through challenges for cause?97
First, the Labat standards for jury selection will have no impact
on the challenge for objection to capital punishment if that case is
restricted to regulating venire selection only.9 8 However, it is
reasonable that those standards should extend to the state's challenge
for cause exclusion. It would afford a defendant little comfort to be
0,365 F.2d at 723.
05 For a discussion of the possible interactions among the three branches of the
test see Note, State Jury Selection Procedure Held a Violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1967 DuKE L.J. 346, 359-63.
GO For a discussion of the importance of ensuring that the jury represent a com-
munity standard see text preceding note 36 supra.
07 See generally Note, Allowing Challenge for Cause to a Prospective Juror
Opposed to Capital Punishment, 45 N.C.L. REv. 1070 (1967).
08The Fifth Circuit's decision in Labat is, of course, not binding on courts of
other circuits or jurisdictions, but is persuasive only.
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granted a truly representative venire, if the grounds for challenge
authorized by the state and utilized by the prosecutor could effec-
tively disfigure the venire before the actual jury were impanelled.
Analogously, it is established that a state may not justify its selec-
tion system 90 by showing the presence of a representative general
venire, when it has subsequently employed a procedure which strips
all Negroes from the group before the final venire is presented to the
state and the defendant. 00 In Eubanks v. Louisiana'01 the Supreme
Court overturned such a system, holding that the individual selec-
tion of jurors for the final venire by the judge rather than by random
drawing was unconstitutional. 02 The jury selection system under
litigation in Labat involved primarily the use of volunteers for the
final venire. Though a volunteer system would seem not to dis-
criminate unfairly against any class, the record did not indicate the
number of Negroes which actually volunteered. 03 Even such an
apparently non-discriminatory plan as this was effectively condemned
when the Fifth Circuit refused to accept the stipulation of the parties
that there was a ten percent representation of Negroes on the gen-
eral venire, and looked instead to the much smaller representation
afforded them on the final voluntary venire. 10 4 The implication is
9 The general venire may be, for example, a card file of names of prospective
jurors culled from the city directory or a similar source. Possibly the prospects will
have been interviewed, and those not meeting statutory standards or claiming some
personal hardship will have been excused before the file is assembled. This compilation
of names may number in the thousands, and from it a more manageable number is
sometimes selected for use during the current year. However, grand jury venires
will at some point be taken out of this group, and petit jury venires will similarly be
selected for the various divisions of the local criminal court. These proposed petit
jury venires may be further refined before a final venire is presented to the parties
before trial. Thus, many selective steps intervene before the final venire is assembled.
However, the defendant (and the prosecutor) have effectively at their disposal only
that cross-section of the community which survives the culling process. The com-
plexity of the procedure is detailed in Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698, 713-15 (5th
Cir. 1966).
100E.g., Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958) (jurors were individually chosen
to serve); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (Negro prospective jurors placed at the
bottom of the list to be called); Scott v. Walker, 358 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1966) (Negroes
removed from panel by assignment to grand jury); see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 222-24 (1965) (dictum) (Negroes removed by prosecutor on peremptory challenge).
101 356 US. 584 (1958). The selection procedure under litigation in Eubanks was
the same as that involved in Labat. See note 99 supra.
102 Intentional discrimination was conclusively presumed in Eubanks when it was
established that Negroes had seldom, if ever, sat on a criminal jury panel which was
composed by personal selection rather than random drawing.




that any procedure which results in excluding the classes discrim-
inated against from actual jury service is constitutionally unaccept-
able. 05 Because of Labat's decree that the classes so protected are
not now limited to the victims of traditional discrimination but en-
compass all community segments for whose exclusion no reasonable
necessity exists,10 and since a state may not accomplish through
indirection what it may not constitutionally do overtly, the bearing of
Labat and the jury exclusion cases on the state's system of challenges
for cause is evident. Those classes which may not be excluded in
the venire selection procedure may similarly not be excluded through
challenges for cause, subject only to the continuing requirement that
challenges be allowed on any showing of actual partiality.10 7
Requisite to the applicability of the Labat standards is the ex-
clusion from jury service of an identifiable class. In everyday
parlance, the word "class" denotes a group of recognizable size with
a common characteristic; and, on the basis of similar beliefs in the
inutility of the death penalty, capital punishment objectors might
legitimately be deemed a class. Historically, however, two nar-
rower tests had to be satisfied before a particular group's inclusion
on juries under the "cross-section of the community" standard
was required: it must be one whose exclusion was not reasonably
related to the end of assembling an impartial jury, and it must
possess some degree of cohesiveness. 08 Under the "reasonable rela-
tion" approach, for example, it has been held proper to exclude law-
yers, who, as officers of the court, have a "public interest" in the
trial; 109 minors, who, vis-4-vis adult defendants, do not represent a
community cross-section since they are "a wholly foreign group un-
10
" Formerly, case law bore out the proposition that any procedure which had the
result of excluding the classes discriminated against, if their absence was not explained
by some reason other than invidious discrimination, was unconstitutional. See, e.g.,
Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584
(1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Avery v. Georgia, 34M U.S. 559
(1953); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith
v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
100 See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
107 As challenges for cause are necessary to remove biased jurors, the right to such
challenges is of constitutional magnitude. See note 51 supra.
208 Note, 38 Miss. L.J. 508, 511 (1967). For a discussion of the "class" concept in
the federal courts see Note, The Congress, The Court and jury Selection: A Critique
of Titles I and II of the Civil Rights Bill of 1966, 52 VA. L. Rav. 1069, 1131 & n.324
(1966).
100 Harrison v. State, 231 Ind. 147, 160, 106 N.E.2d 912, 919-20 (1952).
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related to the adult stream...;,,110 and those without an eighth grade
education, as the education level achieved to some extent reflects
intelligence.""
Exemplary of classes held not to possess a minimum amount of
"cohesiveness" are non-voters, who are unified only by apathy.112
However, a recent case held that those who would not affirm a belief
in God constituted a class which could not constitutionally be elim-
inated from jury panels.11 3 Another court, although holding that
those aged twenty-one to twenty-five were not a cognizable class," 4
seemed to base its decision not so much on the incohesiveness of the
class as upon the fact that it was not expected that they would repre-
sent a community viewpoint different from that of eligible citizens.
Thus, the cohesiveness element appears to require that class mem-
bers possess more-than-casual, common identifying characteristics,
which may be found in the stance assumed by the class on religious,
political, or community matters.
It is precisely a unique community viewpoint which identifies
capital punishment objectors, like non-believers, as a cohesive class.
Indeed, empirical research is beginning to verify the uniqueness of
viewpoint held by capital punishment objectors. Thus, recent
studies indicate that those who favor and those who oppose capital
110 George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 454 (9th Cir. 1952).
11 United States v. Henderson, 298 F.2d 522, 524-25 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 878 (1962). The first two branches of the Labat triple test-public need and
competency-subsume the considerations which formerly were directed to determine
whether an exclusion had a "reasonable relation" to the assembly of a proper jury.
However, the cross-section requirement emphasized by Labat limits exclusions seem-
ingly justifiable under public need and competency if those exclusions make noticeable
inroads upon the representativeness of the panel. Therefore, an education require-
ment, for example, might be invalid under the Labat test if it eliminated from jury
service a large percentage of the population, even though an education requirement
would meet the old qualification of "reasonable relation." Thus, it follows that the
"reasonable relation" approach has been heavily modified, and its precedents eroded,
by the triple test in Labat.
112 See United States v. Greenberg, 200 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The petitioner
in Greenberg attempted to construct a political classification for non-voters: tile
"politically dormant."
""See note 93 supra. The court noted that the statute authorizing the exclusion
of non-believers had been held violative of the first amendment. Therefore, trial by
juries selected in accordance with this unconstitutional statute was a violation of due
process, requiring reversal of a conviction without the necessity for proving prejudice.
State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 273-74, 213 A.2d 880, 885 (1965). Though the result
of the decision is to render non-believers an improper class for exclusion, the reasoning
of the case is not primarily directed toward establishing guidelines for class definition.
Rather, it was assumed that non-believers form a class.
114 King v. United States, 846 F.2d 123 (Ist Cir. 1965).
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punishment differ on a complex of values, including the approach
they take not only to punishment but also to the process of initial
guilt determination. 115 In the past, the allegation that juries quali-
fied on the capital punishment question were more prone to convict
than others has met with no success in the courts;"x6 however, in no
case yet decided has support for this contention been sought from
the bulk of material which is beginning to emerge on the question.
For example, in Fay v. New York" 7 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that its reluctance to strike down blue ribbon juries arose from
an unwillingness to concede, in the absence of evidence, that the
viewpoint of the excluded working classes would have produced a
significantly different result from that reached by the more privi-
leged groups represented on the panel."" However, the necessity for
presenting sociological studies of the unique community viewpoint
held by capital punishment objectors will diminish if the expanding
concept of proper jury representation introduced by Labat draws
further support, for the rationale of that case posits that members of
those groups who might have an individual viewpoint representative
of a cognizable segment of the community must be included as
jurors, unless their absence is justified.1 9 Under such a community-
viewpoint test, capital punishment objectors are a necessary class for
jury inclusion. This result is well adapted to the continuation of
11r See Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Punish-
ment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issue of Guilt?, 39 Tax. L. REv. 545 (1961).
Mr. Oberer's conclusion is that a jury qualified on the capital punishment issue
would be more likely to convict, and that due process was abridged by trial by
a jury stripped of "the most humane of its prospective members." Id. at 549.
"[T]he death penalty qualification of the jurors, in order to provide the prosecutor
with an 'impartial' jury on the issue of punishment, denies to the defendant, as a
corollary, a similarly impartial jury on the more basic issue of guilt or innocence."
Id. at 547. Mr. Oberer wrote, however, without the supporting structure of case law,
culminating in Labat, on the expanding concept of cross-section.
116 E.g., Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 273 (1947); Turberville v. United States,
303 F.2d 411, 420-21 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962). In granting cer-
tiorari in State v. Bumpers, 270 N.C. 521, S.E.2d 173 (1967), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 1034
(1968), the Court has agreed to consider the constitutionality of the challenge for cause
to capital punishment objectors. As Bumpers did not receive the death penalty, how-
ever, his contention that the challenge violated his due process rights necessarily rests
on an assertion that those who do not disfavor capital punishment are more prone than
others to convict. See Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 13-14, State v. Bumpers, supra.
11' 332 U.S. 261 (1947).
18 Id. at 291-92.




the basic jury function of bringing to the adjudicative process the
standards of the community.120
Once qualified as a class which is properly part of the community
cross-section, capital punishment objectors are a class for whose
exclusion no reasonable necessity exists under the Labat tests, which
might be considered further refinements on the "reasonable rela-
tion" test for identifying classes which may properly be excluded.
The "public need" category of exclusions is concerned with the isola-
tion of those occupational classes whose uninterrupted performance
of their normal services for the community is deemed more vital than
their participation as jurors. Firemen might be an example. Since
capital punishment objectors may be scattered throughout many
occupational categories, their exclusion is obviously not justifiable
on the basis of "public need." Therefore, if such an exclusion is
acceptable at all, it must be founded upon the "competency" cri-
terion. The rhetoric directed at justifying the exclusion on this
ground has dwelt on the alleged probability that jurors with scruples
will not be fair to the state's case. Thus, when the jury is given the
opportunity of choosing life or death, a juror committed not to
choose death may deprive the state of a sanction. 121 However, this
rhetoric is probably resorted to in aid of a more practical concern
that capital punishment objectors would conceivably deadlock a jury
operating on the Andres requirement of juror unanimity on punish-
ment even though unanimity as to guilt had been achieved.122 This
objection could be met by propounding a voir dire question-nar-
rower than that generally used-distinguishing among varying degrees
of opposition to capital punishment. If there is any kind of case in
which a juror admits that he would be willing to return a death
verdict, it is not capital punishment to which he objects, but rather
its unrestrained application. However, the questions often pro-
pounded on voir dire inquire only as to whether the juror holds any
conscientious opinions, or scruples, regarding capital punishment.
Arguably, any layman confronted with that question will say he has
scruples if he is somewhat unhappy about death sentences. How-
ever, a general question as to the presence of mere reservations is
120 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
121 See People v. Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 305 P.2d 1 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 980
(1957).
122 See cases discussed in text accompanying notes 68-74 supra.
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far from the inquiry which separates those who would never vote
for the ultimate penalty from those who would reserve it for the
direst cases. Such differentiation could be accomplished by more
definitive questioning, after which one who steadfastly refused ever
to impose death could be excused as incompetent, since he could
not accord to the state the benefit of a sanction legislatively pro-
vided. All others, however, satisfy the competency test and are not
committed to deny the state a sanction prior to hearing the case.
Their exclusion from the community cross-section through an over-
inclusive classification created by a general voir dire question is
clearly improper under the due process standard of Labat.
As a greater spread of community sentiment becomes represented
on juries, it is likely to produce added expense of judicial time and
effort resulting from the operation of the unanimity requirement.
However, the spectre of hung juries is an avoidable evil if statutes
are drafted to require that death sentences be unanimous, but that
life imprisonment be imposed upon jury disagreement as to punish-
ment.12 Furthermore, if numbered among the jurors there is none
who would refuse ever to impose death, the ultimate sanction could
continue to be applied for the graver offenses. Because the "right"
of the state to the death penalty could be otherwise assured, those
prospective jurors who merely state some degree of opposition to the
death penalty are not a class for whose exclusion a reasonable neces-
sity exists. Their absence, therefore, denies the defendant the
benefit of trial by a representative cross-section of the community.
CONCLUSION
By a modification of voir dire questioning, the continuation of
capital punishment, an alternative which the states apparently wish
to preserve, may be reconciled with the advancing constitutional re-
12
' The Andres decision seems, in dictum, to preclude Congress from drafting a
statute to provide life imprisonment upon jury disagreement over the death sentence.
See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text. However, under a federal statute
allowing a jury to recommend life imprisonment by less than a unanimous vote, no
constitutional challenge could be made under the Andres standard. It is verdicts
which must be unanimous; however, recommendations by the jury as to life im-
prisonment could be judicially construed as separate from the verdict, so that the
unanimity requirement is obviated for such recommendations. For example, no case
in North Carolina has decided whether unanimity is required on life imprisonment
under the operative state statute providing a choice between life or death. The
strongest intimation is that the North Carolina statute is to be given the same con-
Vol. 1968: 283]
310 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1968:283
quirements for jury selection and with the historic function of the
jury as representative of contemporary community standards. On
voir dire, it will be necessary to formulate specific questions designed
to uncover degrees of opposition felt by the juror who states some
scruple. To confine most tightly the class to be excluded, the ques-
tion might properly be: "Mr. Juror, could you under any circum-
stances impose capital punishment?" Those persons answering in
the negative could then be challenged for cause by the state. In addi-
tion, if the prosecutor elects, he could direct his peremptory chal-
lenges to those who state some degree of opposition short of dis-
qualification. But no longer should a blanket exclusion apply to all
those community members who participate in a generalized hesita-
tion about the wisdom of death sentences.
struction favored in Andres. See State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967)
(relying on the Puff case). However, a specific future holding to the contrary is not
precluded by North Carolina case history.
